O problema do conhecimento de Deus: a basicidade apropriada da crença teísta e as objeções great pumpkin

Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze the Great Pumpkin-type objections formulated against the appropriate basicity of theistic belief as defended by the philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932-). In this context, the thesis that theistic belief can be appropriately basic constitutes the object of this research, while its problem can be summarized in the following question: if belief in God is appropriately basic, why could we not think the same thing about any other belief? In the first chapter, we present the discussion on the rationality of religious belief and the rejection of the evidentialist objection to theistic belief by Plantinga, based on the critique formulated by Reformed Epistemology of Natural Theology. In the second chapter, we deal with the problem of the analysis of propositional knowledge, of the criticisms formulated by Alvin Plantinga to the “classic package” of epistemology (classic foundationalism-evidentialism-deontologism) and we present the theory of the proper function proposed by Plantinga. In the third chapter, we describe how the proper functionalism was applied to theistic belief, from the construction of the Aquinas / Calvin Model, we analyzed the Great Pumpkin-like objections, mainly those formulated by Michael Martin (1990) and Keith DeRose (1999) and we maintain that it is possible to defend the idea of the proper basicity of belief in God, without admitting that it is rational to believe in bizarre beliefs. The methodology employed consisted of analysis and criticism of Plantinga's arguments, fundamentally found in his Warrant trilogy (1993a, 1993b and 2000), mainly his magnum opus Warranted Christian Belief (2000), confronting them with the objections of his critics. In the end, we maintain that it is possible to defend the proper basicity of the belief in God as articulated by Plantinga.