Mero aborrecimento : entre a (in)existência e a (ir)relevância

Abstract

This work is dedicated to the study of mere annoyance, from the perspective of the filters of civil liability and the theory of legal fact, which is used as a basis for excluding moral damage in various cases that come to the attention of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ). Mere annoyance entered the jurisprudence of this higher court through the judgment of REsp n. 215.666/RJ, in 2001, and was understood as a cause excluding compensation for moral damages, since the daily facts of life are not liable to subject the other to the obligation to indemnify. Through bibliographical and documentary research, both in doctrine and on the STJ's own website, it can be seen that mere annoyance confuses the understanding of damage in the world of facts and damage in its legal sense. With the analysis carried out, linked to the conceptual foundations incorporated by the STJ, it is possible to reach the conclusion presented here, so that the use of the expression “mere annoyance”, even if it is eventually right to exclude moral damage, is technical.