As ameaças híbridas e cibernéticas aos cabos submarinos de comunicação e as limitações da CNUDM : uma análise dos incidentes no Mar Báltico (2023–2024)

Abstract

This study examines the vulnerability of submarine cable infrastructure, essential to global connectivity, in the face of hybrid and cyber threats. It addresses the following research question: how do such threats reveal the limits of the normative regime established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in protecting these critical infrastructures? The theoretical framework is grounded in Critical Infrastructure theory and global governance approaches, while the methodology adopts a qualitative design based on bibliographic research, documentary analysis, and the empirical examination of paradigmatic incidents that occurred in the Baltic Sea (2023–2024). The main findings indicate that UNCLOS suffers from normative anachronism by focusing exclusively on material damage while disregarding logical intrusions and cyberattacks. The study identifies a crisis of legal attribution, exacerbated by the use of shadow fleets and plausible-deniability tactics in gray-zone operations, which challenge classical standards of attribution. It concludes that there is a need for the adoption of an Additional Protocol or a specific binding international instrument capable of overcoming the strictly civil logic of liability and establishing expanded mechanisms of international jurisdiction aimed at protecting the infrastructures that sustain global digital connectivity.